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CIVIL PROCEDURE: De-designation experts from testifying to non-testifying witness 
 
Opinion 
 The issue here is whether a witness originally designated as a testifying expert who is 
then later de-designated may be deposed or called to testify at trial by an opposing party. The 
Court held that after an expert report has been disclosed, a testifying expert witness cannot regain 
the confidentiality protections of NRCP 26(b)(4)(B) by being de-designated as a non-testifying 
expert. The Court reasoned that after an expert witness loses protection under the statute that it is 
at the discretion of the district court as to whether the expert may be deposed or called to testify 
at trial by an opposing party. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 The case arises from a motor vehicle accident. Respondent Collins designated an expert 
witness, Dr. Appel, and filed an expert report and two supplemental reports. Before appellant 
McClendon could depose Dr. Appel, Collins de-designated Dr. Appel as a testifying expert 
witness and filed a motion for protective order to prevent McClendon from deposing or calling 
Dr. Appel at trial. McClendon filed a motion to 1) designate Dr. Appel as her own expert 
witness, 2) take his deposition, and 3) use his written opinions and deposition at trial. The district 
court granted Collin’s motion for a protective order and denied McClendon’s motion. After a 
trial via the short trial program, the jury entered judgment in favor of Collins. The issue on 
appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow McClendon to 
depose or call Dr. Appel to testify at trial. 
 
Discussion 
De-designated expert witnesses can be deposed or called to testify at trial by an opposing party 
in limited circumstances 
 NRCP 26(b)(4)(A) states that “[a] party may depose any person who has been identified 
as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial.”2 Additionally, NRCP 26(B)(4)(B) states 
that a party may not depose or discover facts or opinions from non-testifying experts unless 
“exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to 
obtain facts or opinions of the same subject by other means.”3 The rules are silent in regards to 
the issue of whether an originally designated testifying expert who is later de-designated may be 
deposed or called as a witness by the opposing party. The Court noted that NRCP 26(b)(4)(A) 
and (B) were nearly identical to their federal counterparts, FRCP 26(B)(4)(A) and (D). Thus, the 
court looked to other jurisdictions, primarily the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit, for persuasive 
authority. 
 The Seventh Circuit held that after an expert has been originally designated as a testifying 
expert witness and has produced an expert report the expert cannot be de-designated as a non-
testifying expert in order to avoid having the expert deposed or called to testify at trial.4 The 
Seventh Circuit identified that the key point in time of when “the opportunity to invoke 
																																								 																				
1		Summary by Colton Loretz, Nevada Law Journal, Articles Editor (2016–2017), Junior Staff (2015–2016) at 
William S. Boyd School of Law.	
2  NRCP 26(b)(4)(A). 
3  NRCP 26(b)(4)(B). 
4  See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Koenig, 557 F.3d 736, 744 (7th Cir. 2009). 
confidentiality” ends is upon the disclosure of an expert report; thus, the Koenig court suggests 
that de-designating an expert before any report is disclosed is permissible.5 The Eleventh Circuit 
similarly stated that a designated testifying expert witness may not regain the confidentiality 
protections simply by de-designation.6 The Peterson court qualified this holding by stating that 
once an expert is de-designated, it is at the discretion of the district court to allow an opposing 
party to depose or call that expert to testify.7 
 Even though the federal courts have held that the expert witness confidentiality 
protections fall away, this does not create “an ‘entitlement’ of the opposing party to depose or 
use another party’s expert at trial.”8 The court in House stated that “the proper standard in these 
circumstances is a ‘discretionary’ standard, where the trial court’s discretion is guided by a 
balancing of probative value against prejudice under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 403, [the federal 
counterpart to NRS 48.035].”9 The House court determined that the district court should consider 
whether testimony is duplicative or cumulative of other testimony and whether opposing parties 
are attempting to “piggyback[ ] on another party’s trial preparation[.]”10 
 The Court, agreeing with the federal courts, held that the pivotal point is when an expert 
report has been disclosed. It is at this point that a testifying expert witness cannot regain the 
confidentiality protections of NRCP 26(b)(4)(B) by de-designation of such a witness to the status 
of non-testifying expert. However, this is not a total bar to any further use of such expert witness, 
because it is in the district court’s discretion to determine whether the expert witness may be 
deposed or called to testify at trial by an opposing party. The Court stated that the discretion is to 
be guided by a balancing of probative value against unfair prejudice under NRS 48.035 and 
reiterated two examples that the federal court referenced for when exclusion would be 
appropriate: 1) excluding the expert’s testimony where it would be duplicative or cumulative; 
and 2) where the opposing party is attempting to use the testimony to piggyback off of the 
preparation of the designating party. 
 
Evidence of opposing party’s original retention is not admissible 
 The Court next analyzed whether evidence of the opposing party’s original retention of 
the expert is admissible. The Court was worried that such evidence has the possibility of 
“destroy[ing] counsel’s credibility in the eyes of the jury” because “[j]urors unfamiliar with the 
role of counsel in adversary proceedings might well assume that plaintiff’s counsel had 
suppressed evidence which he had an obligation to offer.”11 
Some federal courts have held that there is unfair prejudice against the party who retained 
the expert, and, thus, the evidence is inadmissible.12  In accordance with the federal courts, the 
Supreme Court of Nevada held that evidence of an expert’s retention is inadmissible when a de-
designated expert is allowed to be further deposed or called to testify by the opposing party. 
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The district court abused its discretion 
 The Court “review[s] a district court’s decision to [allow] expert testimony for an abuse 
of discretion.”13 Here, the Court noted that the district court’s decision in the interlocutory order 
was “based significantly on the fact that . . . Appel, prior to [Collins] de-designating him as an 
expert witness,” had not been deposed by McClendon.14 However, the pivotal point for when 
protections under NRCP 26(b)(4)(B) are lost is upon disclosure of an expert report and not when 
a deposition is performed. Thus, the Court held that since the expert disclosed the report, along 
with two supplements, that the district court abused its discretion by significantly basing its 
decision on the fact that Appel had not yet been deposed. 
 
The error was harmless 
 When a moving party shows that an error is prejudicial, the error is not harmless, and, 
thus, reversal may be appropriate.15 “To establish that an error is prejudicial, the movant must 
show that the error affects the party’s substantial rights so that, but for the alleged error, a 
different result might reasonably have been reached.”16 Appellant is responsible for making and 
providing an appellate record, and a failure to do so will create a presumption that the missing 
record or portion of the record supports the district court’s decision.17 
 McClendon failed to provide a trial transcript here, and, therefore, the Court was unable 
to conclude to what extent there was prejudice, if any, to appellant. Therefore, the Court held that 
the district court’s error was harmless. 
 
Conclusion 
 After an expert witness report has been disclosed, an expert witness may not regain 
NRCP 26(b)(4)(B) confidentiality protections. It is in the district court’s discretion to determine 
whether the expert may now be deposed or called to testify by the opposing party. When the de-
designated expert is allowed to testify, evidence of the original retention of the expert by the 
opposing party is inadmissible evidence. The district court abused its discretion, but there was no 
evidence of prejudice to appellant. The error was thus deemed harmless, and the Court affirmed 
the district court’s order and final judgment. 
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